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”Government represents about a third of our gross national product. That is a lot
of our national income to waste by discouraging the best young people from entry.”
Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
1. Introduction
People talk about the quality of politicians as much as the quality of their policy.
This is not surprising, because the quality of politicians profoundly a¤ects the quality
of their policy. More surprisingly, politicians’quality is often ignored in the economic
analysis, although the quality of their policy is carefully scrutinized. By politicians’
quality we simply mean their ability to maximize welfare by making and carrying out
decisions on behalf of the rest of society. Such skills are in scarce supply. Voters would
like to elect competent citizens as their representatives but, typically, these also fare
well outside politics. There is also concern that the attraction of governmental posts
has been eroding. For example, the Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2001) reports that while in 1980 three-quarters of
American graduates from his school went to work for the government, the share has
dropped in two decades to one third. This would suggest that making a career in
government attractive for the most able would call for considerable wage increases. It
has indeed often been argued -especially by politicians themselves -that the reward
for holding public o¢ce should be increased to improve candidate quality.1 There is,
however, an elementary property of politics that may render such an action ine¢cient
at best and detrimental at worst. Increasing the reward level may make politics more
lucrative not only to high-ability citizens but also to low-ability citizens, who also have
a chance in elections due to electoral uncertainty. The purpose of this study is to
provide a stylized framework to examine when the candidate quality increases with the
reward level, and when it does not.
Because the citizen-candidate models of representative democracy, pioneered by
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), render the set of candidates
endogenous, they provide a natural framework for our study of candidate quality. In
an archetypal citizen-candidate model any citizen may enter electoral competition at a
cost, and then all citizens elect politicians from the group of self-declared candidates.
Such a simple description of democracy involves many attractive properties, but it
renders political parties redundant, which contrasts with their prominent gategeeping
role in modern elections. Often only citizens nominated as candidates of a major
party stand a realistic chance, especially in national elections. We extend the citizen-
candidate approach by adding two parties, and assume that a party selects its candidate
for the general election from the citizens who would like to become the o¢cial candidate
of the party.
In our model citizens contemplating candidacy weight the expected payo¤ from
1The argument has been put forward to justify the relatively high salaries and compensation of
the members of the European Parliament. It was one of the main justi…cations for the 35 percent
increase in the salaries of the members of the Finnish Parliament in 2000.
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winning an election against campaigning costs and income available outside politics.
The citizens di¤er in their earning potential outside politics and in their competence
in the o¢ce but, for each citizen, the earning potential and competence are positively
correlated. Voters would like to have competent o¢ce holders, but candidates have
private information about their ability. To capture the inherent random factors of
political life, we assume that campaigning creates a noisy signal of the candidates’
ability and that the candidates know only their probability of emitting a good signal.
As in Caillaud and Tirole (2002), parties act as political intermediaries that reduce
voters’informational de…cit. The parties organize primary elections to screen the
candidates so that the ability distribution of the candidates in the general election will
be improved.
Our analysis reveals that the e¤ects of the reward for o¢ce holders and campaigning
costs are not straightforward. Although our model predicts that the candidate quality
is increasing in the reward for low campaigning costs, the prediction is reversed for
su¢ciently high campaigning costs and initial rewards. The …nding has far reaching
implications. In designing the optimal rewards for the elected o¢cials, the campaigning
costs should be given proper attention. It may be possible to design rewards to screen
competent candidates, but only when the campaigning costs are high. When they are
low, there is no way to deter low-ability citizens from running for o¢ce.
We build on strong foundations. There is extensive literature in which represen-
tative democracy is regarded as a principal-agent relationship where voters delegate
political power to selected candidates.2 Such delegation of decisions leads to well-known
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. A moral hazard problem arises, as
politicians need not act in the interest of their voters. Since it is di¢cult to pro-
vide formal incentives in politics, implicit incentives in the form of career concerns
may mitigate the moral hazard problem (Holmström, 1982, and Persson and Tabellini,
2000). The adverse selection problem results from asymmetric information concerning
the quality of candidates or platforms, as well as from the fact that voters can select
politicians only from those citizens who run for the o¢ce. Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988)
and Rogo¤ (1990) show that when incumbent politicians have private information on
their competence, career concerns may lead to political budget cycles.
Recent research has raised some fresh issues concerning moral hazard and adverse
selection problems in politics. Gersbach (2004) and Gersbach and Liessem (2001)
study whether the incentive contracts o¤ered to voters by politicians could constitute a
solution to the moral hazard problem. Besides the incentive contracts, the politicians’
opportunistic behavior could also be constrained by the party system as argued by
Caillaud and Tirole (2002). We also view parties as delegated monitors, but we focus
on the parties’screening role in mitigating the adverse selection problem. Carrillo and
Mariotti (2001), like us, analyze the quality of candidates in a two-party system where
electoral campaign provides voters with information on candidates. They are, however,
2For excellent surveys, see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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primarily interested in the e¤ect of electoral competition on the turnover of candidates.
The closest papers to ours are Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn
(2004), and Besley (2004) who also study the candidate quality in the citizen-candidate
framework and emphasize the payo¤ from winning an election and the opportunity cost
of candidacy in determining the quality of politicians.3 There is, however, a number
of di¤erences between our work and theirs. For example, Caselli and Morelli (2004)
assume that candidates know in advance whether they can convince the electorate of
their quality and Messner and Polborn (2004) assume that the abilities of potential
candidates are known to voters, but their opportunity costs are private information.
Besley (2004) focuses on the agency problem of incumbents subject to a two-period
limit, assuming a random selection of politicians and abstracting from campaigning
costs.
In the next section we present our model. It has three key parameters: the reward
for o¢ce holders, campaigning costs, and the citizens’ability level. The values of the
parameters specify the choice between politics and a private career. In section 3, we
characterize the political equilibria. There turns out to be a unique equilibrium set of
candidates for a given campaigning cost and a given reward. We show how the level
of campaigning costs determines whether an increase in the reward for o¢ce holders
increases or decreases the candidate quality. The political system that maximizes
the average quality of candidates is assessed in section 4. Ways to pursue plausible
extensions are brie‡y discussed in the concluding section (section 5).
2. The Model
We study a two-party system with twice as many candidates as seats. We do not ex-
plicitly model the role of policy-makers, but simply assume that representative o¢cials
are needed to make decisions on behalf of the rest of society. The higher the represen-
tatives’abilities, the better they can serve the interests of society. The representatives
are selected in a general election where all citizens, including the candidates, have one
vote, which is valid only if cast for an o¢cial candidate of a party. We focus on one
district where the candidate receiving the majority of votes in the general election is
elected. In the event of a tie, the winner is selected by a lottery.
Citizens can be identi…ed by their abilities. Citizen ?’s ability is denoted by ??, and,
as we will explain in detail below, it has a dual role in our model: both the citizen’s
reservation wage outside politics and the probability of electoral success depend on the
ability. This gives the two parties an incentive to organize primaries to screen their
pool of candidates.
We consider an electoral game of three stages. The …rst is the entry stage, where
each citizen decides whether to stand for an election or not. In the primary election
stage the parties select their candidates from the set of the citizens who express an
3We became aware of contributions by Besley (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004) after having
completed our study independently.
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interest in candidacy in the …rst stage. The third stage is the general election, where
the citizens vote for one of the candidates.
The decision whether to enter politics or not is based on the maximization of the
expected utility. When indi¤erent, citizens enter politics. Unsuccessful candidates and
the citizens abstaining from politics collect their reservation wages. Without loss of
generality, we assume that citizen ? earns ?? outside politics.4 Each candidate incurs a
campaigning cost, ?, regardless of the eventual outcome of the election. A successful
candidate, an elected o¢cial, is rewarded by ?. Note that ? and ? need not to be
monetary. For example, campaigning may involve psychological costs such as losing
privacy and being subject to papparazzi journalism. Being elected, on the other hand,
may give ego rents as discussed, e.g., in Rogo¤ (1990).
Voters do not know the candidates’abilities, but campaigning creates a noisy signal
? 2 f???g of the ability level where the signal can take only two values, high (?) and
low (?). Assuming that ?? is distributed over a unit interval we can let the probability
of candidate ? emitting signal ? in the general election be given by
Pr(?? = ? j ??) = ??? (1)
The complementary probability, i.e., the probability that candidate ? signals ?, is then
Pr(?? = ? j ??) = 1¡ ??? (2)
Also party primaries produce a signal of candidates’abilities. The probability that
a primary election candidate ? emits a signal ? is given by
Pr(??? = ? j ??) =
?? + ?
1 + ?
? (3)
where the presence of ?? ? ? 0? captures the assumption that it is easier to generate a
good signal in primary elections.5 Therefore, even citizens with ? = 0 have a positive
probability of emitting signal ? in a primary.
Finally, we specify that the density function of citizen ?’s ability is given by
?(?) = ?
1 + ?
?+ ?
? (4)
where ? ´ 1
(1+?) ln(1+ 1? )
solves
R 1
0
?(?)?? = 1. For a …nite ?, (4) suggests that higher
ability levels are less likely. Moreover, together with the signalling technology of the
party primaries (3), (4) implies that the ability of the citizens who signal ? in the
primaries will be uniformly distributed, allowing for an analytic solution of the model.
4Regarding the reservation wage as ? + ???, where ? and ? are positive constants, would not
qualitatively change the analysis.
5This assumption could be motivated, for example, by tougher media scrutinity of candidates in
general elections.
4
As will be explained in section 3.1., this means that the party primaries provide an
additional screening stage that improves the average quality of candidates.
The timing of events is summarized in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 here
Figure 1. Electoral game.
We construct political equilibria of the model by using the concept of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Such equilibria consist of three components: 1) Citizens’de-
cisions whether to enter primary elections. Let ?? 2 f0? 1g denote citizen ?’s entry
decision where ?? = 1 if the citizen enters a party primary and ?? = 0 if he or she does
not. 2) Citizens’voting behavior, which describes how the citizens vote as a function
of the information they have received from the campaign. We assume that all vote,
and that they vote as if their votes were pivotal. This implies that voters prefer the
candidate with higher expected ability, randomizing their vote if indi¤erent. 3) Voters’
belief function, which describes a common assessment that candidate ? is of higher
expected ability than candidate ? conditional on the signals that voters observe. In
other words, given ??, ??, ??, and ??, voters can share one of three alternative beliefs.
We denote the belief that ?(??) ? ?(??) by 1, the belief that ?(??) ? ?(??) by ¡1,
and the belief that ?(??) = ?(??) by 0. Let ?(??? ?? ? ??? ??) 2 f1?¡1? 0g denote the
voters’belief given the candidates’entry decisions and the signals they have emitted.
Bayesian updating implies that ?(1? 1? ?? ?) = 1, ?(1? 1? ???) = ¡1, ?(1? 1? ???) = 0,
and ?(1? 1? ?? ?) = 0.
2.1. General Election
Given the belief ? and our assumptions about voting behavior, a candidate sig-
nalling ? wins the general election with a probability of one, when the opponent
signals ?. If both candidates send the same signal, each candidate wins with a proba-
bility of one-half. In sum, if candidates ? and ? run for an o¢ce as o¢cial candidates,
candidate ? wins with a probability of ?(? j ??? ??), which is given by
?(? j ??? ??) = Pr(?? = ? j ??) Pr(?? = ? j ??)+
1
2
[Pr(?? = ? j ??) Pr(?? = ? j ??) + Pr(?? = ? j ??) Pr(?? = ? j ??)] ? (5)
Substituting (1) and (2) for (5) and simplifying, (5) can be expressed as
?(? j ??? ??) = 1 + ?? ¡ ??
2
. (6)
Equation (6) captures the inherent uncertainty of democratic elections. While the prob-
ability of being elected is increasing in candidate’s relative ability, the better candidate
cannot be certain of winning the election.
2.2. Primary Election Stage
The o¢cial candidates are nominated by two parties, who select their candidates in
their primaries. We focus on symmetric political equilibria where voters favor neither
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party ex ante and, consequently, the abilities of the candidates of the two parties follow
the same distribution.6 As a result, there is a set of primary election candidates ?(?? ?)
who have committed to campaigning if nominated as the o¢cial candidate of a party.
The members of the party prefer candidates who send a good signal in their primary
election, because such candidates have both a better chance of winning the general
election and higher expected competence to serve society. If several candidates signal
? in the primary, the o¢cial candidate is randomly selected among them. Finally,
we make two assumptions which are inconsequential in large electorates, but which
simplify the analysis in elections with a small number of potential candidates. First,
signals in primaries are drawn until at least one ?-signal is obtained. When ? ? 0, this
occurs with probability one when the signal extraction is repeated su¢ciently many
rounds.7 Second, there is at least one citizen with ability zero among the potential
candidates of each party.
We now proceed to the …rst stage where the citizens choose whether they pursue a
career in politics.
2.3. Entry Stage
Note that (6) measures the winning probability after both parties have nominated
the candidates. When a citizen contemplates candidacy the winning probability should
be calculated before the parties select their candidates. Formally, if citizen ? decides
to run for o¢ce, the winning probability is given by
? (? j ??) =
Z ?
?
?(? j ??? ?)?(?)??, (7)
where ?(?) is the density function of the abilities of the primary election candidates
who signal ?. By (3) and (4), the ability distribution of candidates emerging from
the primaries is uniform on the interval that is determined by the start and end points
of the ability distribution of primary election candidates. We therefore proceed under
the assumption that the candidates’abilities are uniformly distributed between ? and
?, which denote the lowest and highest ability of the potential opponent with 0 · ? ·
? · 1. The ability thresholds ? and ? are determined as part of the equilibrium where
each citizen takes them as given when deciding whether to run for o¢ce or not. We
denote the set of the abilities from which candidates are selected by ?(?? ?) = [?? ?].
6Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) also abstract from ideological considerations, and assume that parties
choose new candidates from the same exogenous ability distribution. Here the equivalence of the
candidates’ability distribution between the parties is a result, not an assumption. In a longer version
of this paper (IZA Discussion Paper No. 1195), we consider voters’ideological preferences over the
parties.
7To rule out the use of repeated primaries as yet another screening device, we assume that once
a candidate has signalled ? in a primary, the signal persists until the launch of general election
campaign.
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By using the uniformity of the distribution of those who actually become candidates
and (6), (7) can be rewritten as
? (? j ??) = 1
2(?¡ ?)
Z ?
?
(1 + ?? ¡ ?) ??? (8)
Equation (8) is equivalent to
? (? j ??) = 1 + ?? ¡ ?
2
, (9)
where ? = ?+?
2
denotes the average quality of potential candidates. Given the cam-
paigning cost, ?, the reward for o¢ce holders, ?, the reservation wage, ??, the belief,
?, and the voting behavior, citizen ? decides to run for o¢ce only if
? (? j ??)? + (1¡ ? (? j ??))?? ¡ ? ¸ ??, (10)
where the left-hand side and the right-hand side capture the expected payo¤ of running
for o¢ce and the outside option. Inserting (9) into (10) and simplifying yields
1
2
(1 + ?? ¡ ?)(? ¡ ??)¡ ? ¸ 0. (11)
Equation (11) holds as an equality for the citizens who are indi¤erent between a public
and private career. Letting (11) be an equality and rearranging gives the condition
¡?2? + ?? (? +?¡ 1) + ?(1¡ ?) ¡ 2? = 0. (12)
As the left-hand side of (12) is a downward-opening parable, the values of ? satisfying
(11) are between the values that solve (12). Thus, if a solution exists, it satis…es our
hypothesis that all citizens between ? and ? are interested in candidacy. However, the
solutions of (12) need not be on the open unit interval. Upon solving (12) for ??, we
can write the ability level of the indi¤erent citizens as
? = max
½
0?
1
2
·
? +?¡ 1¡
q
(? + 1¡ ?)2 ¡ 8?
¸¾
(13)
and
? = min
½
1?
1
2
·
? +?¡ 1 +
q
(? + 1¡ ?)2 ¡ 8?
¸¾
. (14)
3. Findings
In this section, we …rst record the role of the political parties in screening candidates.
Then we determine political equilibria, and study the e¤ects of campaigning costs and
rewards for o¢ce holders on the average quality of candidates. We restrict our attention
to the range of parameter values where ? · ? ? 1
2
, and and divide parameter space
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f0 · ? · ?; ? ¸ 0g into di¤erent regions according to the ability range from which
citizens enter politics.8
Before proceeding, we make a remark that is independent of the campaigning costs
and rewards for o¢ce holders:
Proposition 1 The ability distribution of the candidates in the general election …rst-
order stochastically dominates the ability distribution of the primary election candi-
dates, whenever citizens of more than one ability point are willing to run.
Proof. By (3) and (4), the ability distribution of candidates emerging from the
primaries is uniform on the interval that is determined by the start and end points of
the ability distribution of primary election candidates. By (4), the ability distribution
of primary election candidates has more mass on the lower end of the interval.
The screening role of the established political parties can explain why third-party
or independent candidates are seldom successful in convincing the electorate of their
quality.
3.1. Political Equilibria
It turns out that the equilibria we specify are unique for each combination (?? ?).
There is a pooling equilibrium where the set of candidates is ?(?? ?) = [0? 1]. We call it
universal democracy. Then there are three types of semiseparating equilibria, mediocre
candidates when ?(?? ?) = [?? ?] with 0 ? ? · ? ? 1? competent candidates when
?(?? ?) = [?? 1] with ? ? 0, and incompetent candidates when ?(?? ?) = [0? ?] with ? ?
1. It is important to keep in mind that the labels refer to ranges of ability distribution,
not necessarily to the average quality of candidates. For example, mediocre candidates
may have higher average ability than competent candidates or lower average ability
than incompetent candidates. We study below whether this is indeed the case. Finally,
we take that there is a collapse of democracy when the parties cannot be certain that
they are able to nominate a candidate.
It also turns out that various political equilibria can be characterized by dividing
the campaigning costs into two ranges. We say that campaigning costs are relatively
high when ? ? b? ´ 3
8
. Accordingly, they are called relatively low when ? · b?.
Our main results concerning the impact of ? and ? on candidate quality can be
summarized in three propositions. We …rst establish the existence and uniqueness of
the political equilibria:
Proposition 2 ?) Universal democracy prevails when ? · b? and ? ¸ 1 + 4
3
?, or when
? ? b? and ? ¸ 4??
??) Candidates are competent when ? ? b? and ? 2 [2¡ p1¡ 2?? 4?).
8To ensure a properly working democracy, campaigning costs cannot be too large. In the …gures,
we set ? = 0?499. The results for ? ¸ 12 are reported in an earlier version (CESifo Working Paper No.
1103).
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???) Candidates are mediocre when ? ? b? and ? 2 ¡1 +p1¡ 2?? 2¡ p1¡ 2?¢.
??) Candidates are incompetent when ? · b? and ? 2 [2?? 1+ 4
3
?), or when ? ? b? and
? 2 [2?? 1 +p1¡ 2?].
?) If ? ? 2?, there is no equilibrium where both parties nominate a candidate with
a probability one.
??) For ? ¸ 2?, there is a unique symmetric political equilibrium for a given cam-
paigning cost and a given reward.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that when campaigning costs are low, there are only two equi-
libria with properly working democracy, incompetent candidates and universal democ-
racy. In contrast, the equilibria with mediocre and competent candidates emerge for
high campaigning costs besides the other political equilibria. The message of Proposi-
tion 2 can be illustrated in the (?? ?)-space (Figure 2). The region of low campaigning
costs (? · b?) is split by two lines, ? = 2? and ? = 1 + 4
3
?. Below the lower line
(? = 2?) ? there is no democracy in the sense that one or both of parties fail to nom-
inate a candidate. Between the lines, candidates are incompetent. Above the upper
line (? = 1 + 4
3
?), there is universal democracy.
The region of high campaigning costs ? 2 (b?? ?] is divided into …ve subareas by two
lines, ? = 2? and ? = 4?, and two curves, ? = 2¡p1¡ 2? and ? = 1+p1¡ 2?. As in
the case of low campaigning costs, below the lower line (? = 2?), democracy collapses
and, above the upper line (? = 4?), democracy is universal. Between the lower line
(? = 2?) and the lower curve
¡
? = 1 +
p
1¡ 2?¢, candidates are incompetent whereas
between the upper curve
¡
? = 2¡ p1¡ 2?¢ and the upper line (? = 4?), candidates
are competent. Finally, between the curves the candidates are mediocre.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE.
Figure 2. Political equilibria.
Part i) of Proposition 2 suggests, as one would expect, that if the payo¤ from
winning an election is su¢ciently high, everyone is willing to gamble and run for o¢ce.
Analogously, part v) suggests that when the payo¤ is su¢ciently low, no one is willing
to sacri…ce the campaigning costs to become a candidate. If the reward from winning
an election is smaller than campaigning costs, citizens do not enter politics even if they
were certain to win the election. If the reward is low but slightly above the campaigning
costs, citizens could stand for an election if they were rather certain of winning it. But
since both parties can nominate a candidate, the probability of winning cannot exceed
one half for both candidates. This unravels all symmetric equilibria where both parties
nominate a candidate for ? ? 2?.
Parts ii) and iii) of Proposition 2 uncover two requirements for the elected politi-
cians to come from the upper or intermediate range of the ability distribution. The
campaigning costs should be su¢ciently high and the reward for o¢ce holders su¢-
ciently low to deter low-competence citizens from politics. The reward for o¢ce holders,
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however, should not be too low so that it dilutes the high ability citizens’incentives to
engage in politics.
We next turn to the e¤ects of the reward on the average quality of candidates in
each political equilibrium. It is obvious that a change in the reward has no impact in
universal democracy or in the absence of democracy unless the change is su¢ciently
large to move the polity from one equilibrium to another. In the other equilibria, the
e¤ect of the reward is less straightforward.
Proposition 3 With any given ?, an increase in ? increases the average quality of
incompetent and mediocre candidates, and reduces the average quality of competent
candidates.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we establish how the average quality of candidates varies among the political
equilibria:
Proposition 4 a) The average quality of incompetent candidates is lower than the
average candidate quality in universal democracy.
b) For any ? ? b?,
?) the average quality of competent candidates is higher than the average quality of
incompetent candidates and the average candidate quality in universal democracy,
??) the average quality of incompetent candidates is lower than the average quality
of mediocre candidates,
???) the average quality of candidates in the upper (lower) part of the reward range
of mediocre candidates is higher (lower) than in universal democracy,
??) the average quality of candidates in the upper (lower) part of the reward range
of mediocre candidates is higher (lower) than in the upper (lower) part of the reward
range of competent candidates.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The …ndings of Propositions 2-4 are somewhat surprising when they are evaluated
against the common view (and the …ndings in Caselli and Morelli, 2004) that increasing
the reward for o¢ce holders or decreasing the campaigning costs improves the candidate
quality. The propositions suggest that the range of parameters where the common
view holds is rather restricted. Proposition 3 shows how, in the region of competent
candidates, increasing the reward or reducing the campaigning cost results in a decrease
in the average quality of candidates, as it also encourages low-ability citizens to run.
When campaigning is costly, the low-ability citizens are reluctant to run for the o¢ce,
since their prospects of being elected are low. Thus, decreasing the expected returns
on campaigning e¤ectively excludes the low-ability citizens from the set of candidates.
In contrast, when campaigning is cheap, there is no way to screen good candidates,
because the low-ability citizens are eager to run even when the payo¤ from winning is
low. Combining Proposition 2 with Proposition 4 implies that increasing the reward
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for o¢ce holders reduces the average quality of candidates, when it causes a shift from
competent candidates to universal democracy. The average quality of candidates may
also decrease if the increase in the reward relocates the polity from mediocre candidates
to universal democracy, or even to competent candidates.
To illustrate the regions of high and low average qualities of candidates, we present
in Figure 3 regions of relatively low (below 0.4) and relatively high (above 0.6) average
candidate quality. Figure 3 suggests that a randomly selected polity may easily end
up in an equilibrium with bad politicians, while screening for high-quality politicians
may be more demanding. The …gure also shows that the average quality of candidates
can be higher in the area of mediocre candidates than in the area of competent candi-
dates. When ? ? 0?48, the average quality of competent candidates always falls short
of 0?6 whereas the average quality of mediocre candidates exceeds this level for ? ? 1?6.
Increasing the reward to the level that also citizens with ? = 1 enter electoral com-
petition actually reduces the average quality of candidates, as it also attracts citizens
with lower ability to enter. This indicates that the average quality of candidates may
be maximized when the most able citizens do not enter politics. This surprising result
will be con…rmed in section 4.
Propositions 2-4 indicate that if the campaigning costs are low, the average candi-
date quality can be maximized by choosing a high enough reward to attract everybody
in politics. This can also be seen from Figure 2. If we exclude the campaigning costs, we
will stay on the vertical axis ? = 0 of Figure 2. Then, increasing the pay of politicians
would increase candidate quality until universal democracy is reached.9 As Figure 2
and Propositions 2-4 suggest, however, such a result does not carry over to high values
of campaigning costs. High campaigning costs are a necessary condition for screening
candidates with above average quality. Therefore we will focus on the region of high
campaigning costs (? ? b?) in the remainder of the paper.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE.
Figure 3. Good and bad candidates.
In assessing the reliability of the observations here, a caveat should be kept in mind.
Models with private information raise the question of how robust are …ndings with re-
spect to the parameter that is private information. Fortunately, this is not an issue
here. On the one hand, our …ndings are, broadly speaking, similar to the ones in Mess-
ner and Polborn (2004) where the reward from o¢ce is private information and varies
across candidates. On the other hand, letting campaigning costs be private information
and vary across candidates would certainly change the …ndings, but the problem would
then be rather uninteresting, since the voters care only about candidates’ability, not
their campaigning costs. Such an assumption might be more fruitful in analyzing pri-
vate provision of a public good in a small group like a university department or a school
district, and could result in wars of attrition as suggested by Bliss and Nalebu¤ (1984)
9Indeed, a similar …nding emerges from Besley (2004) where there is neither campaigning costs nor
signaling.
11
and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). Our model predicts that the wars of attrition may
emerge in the region of the collapse of democracy, but for a wide range of parameter
values becoming a politician is attractive at least for some citizens. Because in almost
all elections in large jurisdictions there is more than one candidate, politicians at least
in major elections seem to be pleased to be elected rather than reluctantly concede to
run.
3.2. Interpretation
As illustrated by Figure 2, political equilibria are unique but complex. To better
grasp the underlying economics, we rewrite the condition for citizen ? to enter politics,
(10), as
(? ¡ ??) ¢ ? (? j ??) ¸ ?? (15)
The left-hand side of (15) presents the expected increase in income created by
candidacy. It is the product of the net return from winning election, ? ¡ ??, and the
probability of winning, ? (? j ??). The right-hand side is the campaigning cost, ?,
incurred with certainty. Equation (15) shows that politics is attractive if the expected
increase in income exceeds campaigning costs, and that a change in either ? or ? has
both a direct and an indirect e¤ect on the attractiveness of politics. Keeping ? (? j ??)
constant, the direct e¤ect of an increase in ? or a decrease in ? encourages the entry
to politics for all ability levels. To arrive at full behavioral responses, we also have to
take into account the induced changes in ? (? j ??). If the direct e¤ect improves the
average quality of candidates, there will be a reduction in ? (? j ??). This indirect e¤ect
then discourages the entry into politics. Whether there is ultimately an improvement
in the candidate quality depends on the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect
e¤ects. For example, consider the shift from the area of incompetent candidates to the
area of mediocre candidates in Figure 2. The direct e¤ect of an increase in ? renders
politics lucrative for some new high ability citizens. Because of the new high ability
candidates, ? (? j 0) decreases. When campaigning costs are high, the indirect e¤ect
can dominate over the direct e¤ect for low-ability citizens. As a result, the citizens of
the lowest abilities leave politics and the average candidate quality improves.
To illustrate the direct and indirect e¤ects, we present in Figure 4 ? and ? as a
function of ?, …xing ? = 4
9
. The behavior of ? is easy to explain: The direct e¤ect
of increasing ? always dominates for high-ability types, so that increasingly higher
ability citizens …nd politics attractive when the reward for elected politicians rises.
The behavior of low-ability citizens is more complicated. Initially an increase in the
reward in a case of being elected more than o¤sets the decrease in the probability of
winning caused by the entry of the high-ability citizens, and all low-ability citizens
want to become candidates. However, when 4
3
· ? ? 5
3
, the candidates with the lowest
ability opt out if the reward rises, because the indirect e¤ect of the decreased ? (? j ??)
dominates over the direct e¤ect of the increased ? ¡ ?. Once ? = 5
3
is reached, all
high-ability citizens already are candidates. Then a further increase in ? no longer
dilutes the low-ability citizens’prospects of being elected, thus stimulating them again
12
to participate in politics. Once ? ¸ 16
9
is reached, universal democracy prevails. As a
result, candidates are incompetent when 8
9
· ? · 4
3
, mediocre when 4
3
? ? ? 5
3
, and
competent when 5
3
· ? ? 16
9
. The average quality of candidates …rst increases from
zero until it reaches 2
3
at ? = 5
3
, then declines until it stays ‡at at 1
2
when ? ¸ 16
9
?
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE.
Figure 4. Set of candidates (? = 4
9
).
4. Screening the Best Candidates
In the previous section the set of candidates was determined by the model, but the
reward for o¢ce holders and campaigning costs remained exogenous. This then raises
the question of where they come from. Although a thorough exploration on the issue
is beyond the scope of this study, we here brie‡y assess how to design rewards and
campaigning costs to maximize the average quality of candidates. By Proposition 4,
we only need to compare the maximum average ability of competent candidates to the
maximum average ability of mediocre candidates. Surprisingly, it turns out that the
maximum average ability can be obtained when candidates are mediocre.
Since by Proposition 3 the average ability of competent candidates is decreasing in
the reward, the maximum average ability of competent candidates is obtained when
? = 2¡ p1¡ 2?. In the case of mediocre candidates, the average ability is increasing
in the reward and the limit of the maximum average ability is also obtained at ? =
2¡p1¡ 2?. The limit of the maximum average ability of mediocre candidates is thus
lim
?!2¡p1¡2?
(?¡1) = 1¡p1¡ 2? (see (A9) ), which equals the maximum average ability
of competent candidates, 1¡ p1¡ 2?, when ? · 4
9
(see (A5)). However, when ? ? 4
9
,
the maximum average ability of competent candidates is 1+
p
1¡2?
2
, which is strictly less
than the limit of the maximum average ability of mediocre candidates. Thus, we …nd
that when ? · 4
9
, the maximum average ability of competent candidates equals the
limit of the maximum average ability of mediocre candidates. In contrast, when ? ? 4
9
the maximum average ability of competent candidates is lower. This e¤ect arises as ?
jumps downwards when ? increases to the value ? = 2¡ p1¡ 2?, corresponding to a
shift from mediocre candidates to competent candidates. (See (A4) and (A10), taking
into account that ? ? 4
9
.)
Because the maximum average ability of mediocre candidates is increasing in the
campaigning costs, it is tempting to conclude that by raising ? su¢ciently only the
very best citizens can be attracted to politics. Such an attempt to manipulate ?
and ? to encourage only the very best to enter politics, however, involves a risk of
destroying democracy. To see this, note that the ability range of mediocre candidates is
?¡? = 2p1¡ 2?? Thus, although the maximum average ability of mediocre candidates
is increasing in ?, the size of the pool of potential candidates is decreasing in it. If we
allowed ? = 1
2
? there would be no candidates.10
10This is the reason why campaigning costs cannot be too large (cf. footnote 8). In particular, ?
needs to be strictly smaller than 12 . The upper bound ? approaches
1
2 when the size of the electorate
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The above analysis suggests that the maximum average ability can be obtained
when ? is intermediate and ? is relatively high. Moreover, to maximize the average
ability, not only the lowest ability citizens but also the highest ability citizens should
be kept outside politics. To attract the very best in politics requires high rewards
but such high rewards are even more attractive for low-ability citizens. Note that we
…nd arguments against the engagement of the most able in politics without recourse
to the loss to the private sector. Such loss constitutes yet another reason why it
might be socially undesirable to persuade high-ability citizens to politics. In our model
the ability in politics is perfectly correlated with the earning potential in the private
sector. Therefore, the higher the ability of the elected o¢cial, the larger is the loss
to the private sector. Using the scope of an electoral district as a proxy for social
bene…ts from good politics, it seems that the expected quality of politicians should be
maximum in national and state-level tasks. Proper evaluation of the relative social
bene…ts from politics and private sector activities would, however, require a general
equilibrium environment and is left for future research.
5. Conclusion and Further Research
We …nd that the e¤ects of campaigning costs and the reward for o¢ce holders on the
candidate quality are surprisingly complicated. Depending on the level of campaigning
costs, an increase in the reward for o¢ce holders may increase or decrease candidate
quality. If the costs are high, it may be optimal to decrease the reward to screen good
candidates. When campaigning is cheap, the low-ability citizens have a comparative
advantage in politics, which dilutes the quality of candidates. The …ndings suggest
that high campaigning costs are an essential part of a polity where the ability of an
average candidate exceeds the one of an average citizen. Surprisingly, the highest
average quality of candidates may materialize at an intermediate level of compensation
that deters the most able citizens from entering politics.
Our simple and tractable model invites a number of extensions. Because uncovering
the crucial role of campaigning costs in determining the quality of politicians is one of
our key contributions, future research should devote more attention to the determinants
of campaigning costs. For example, one could assume that the level of campaigning
costs is a choice variable and that the probability of a good signal conditional on the
ability level is increasing in campaigning costs. Catering to special interest groups in
exchange for campaign contributions can also generate an entry barrier to independent
candidates or third parties, in a similar manner as screening through the primaries
of established parties. Studying campaign contributions and informative advertising
is clearly an area that deserves further research. Combining our framework with the
advances by Prat (2002) and Schultz (2003) could turn out to be fruitful in this task.
grows and, even in small electorates, it does not need to be much smaller than 12 ? For example, with
? = 0?495 the ability spread of mediocre candidates is 0?2. If a party has 100 potential candidates
from a uniform ability distribution, the probability of no candidates is 0?8100 = 2?037 £ 10¡10, i.e.,
practically zero.
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Another extension would be to allow for campaigning costs also in primaries.11
We analyze the role of political parties in the absence of ideological considerations.12
Further insights into equilibrium political structure could be obtained by incorporat-
ing some features from Poutvaara (2003) into our model. In his model potential party
activists decide whether to join a party based on previous party platforms. The plat-
forms for the subsequent election are then chosen by median party members. Even
with the given party platforms, there is uncertainty of electoral outcome. Assuming
that such uncertainty arises from electoral campaigning and di¤erences in candidates’
abilities as in this paper, one could let the party members choose a candidate with a
given ideological preference and an unknown ability. Electoral landscape would then be
jointly determined by campaigning costs, political rewards, and ideological distribution
of party activists and voters.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Universal democracy. When all citizens are
potential candidates, the average ability of potential candidates ? equals 1
2
. After
substituting ? = 1
2
for (11) we see that the citizen with the lowest ability (? = 0) is
willing to become a candidate if, and only if,
? ¸ 4?? (A1)
Similarly, substituting ? = 1
2
for (11) and simplifying shows that the citizen with the
highest ability (? = 1) is willing to become a candidate if, and only if,
? ¸ 1 + 4
3
?. (A2)
Equations (A1) and (A2) suggest that all citizens are candidates if ? ¸ max(4?? 1+ 4
3
?).
The proof is completed by noting that the condition 4? T 1 + 4
3
? is equivalent to the
condition ? T b?.
(ii) Competent candidates. When the citizens with the lowest ability choose a
career in the private sector, the average quality of the candidates is ? = 1+?
2
? Equation
(13) can then be rewritten as
? =
1
2
24? ¡ 1 + 1 + ?
2
¡
sµ
? + 1¡ 1 + ?
2
¶2
¡ 8?
35 ?
11The results for a special case of costly primary election campaigning with a restricted number of
candidates and without informative signals are reported in an earlier version (CESifo Working Paper
No. 1103).
12A polarizing ideological issue is present in a longer version of this paper (IZA Discussion Paper
No. 1195).
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Simplifying yields
2? ¡ 1¡ 3? = 2
sµ
? +
1¡ ?
2
¶2
¡ 8?. (A3)
Squaring both sides of (A3) and solving the resulting second-order equation for ? gives
? =
1
2
h
? ¡ 1§
p
(? + 1)2 ¡ 16?
i
.
The smaller root,
? =
1
2
h
? ¡ 1¡
p
(? + 1)2 ¡ 16?
i
? (A4)
is greater than zero only if ? ? 4?. The larger root can be excluded, as it would be
positive also when ? ¸ 4?. That would violate the condition that the citizen with
? = 0 is unwilling to be a candidate. By using (A4), we see that the average quality of
the potential candidates ? = 1+?
2
is given by
? =
1
4
h
? + 1¡
p
(? + 1)2 ¡ 16?
i
? (A5)
We next con…rm that the citizen with the highest ability is willing to be a candidate,
i.e., that ? = 1. From (14) we see that this holds if
1
2
·
? +?¡ 1 +
q
(? + 1¡ ?)2 ¡ 8?
¸
¸ 1? (A6)
Upon some manipulation, (A6) can be simpli…ed to
(2¡ ?)(? ¡ 1)¡ 2? ¸ 0? (A7)
After substituting (A5) for (A7) and some laborious algebra, the condition can be
re-expressed as
(? ¡ 1)2(? ¡ 3)¡ 2?(? ¡ 1)(? ¡ 4)¡ 4?2 ¸ 0? (A8)
We can now characterize the equilibria where only the most competent citizens
present themselves as candidates. Although (A8) is highly non-linear in ?, it is easy to
show that it holds only if ? ¸ 2 +p1¡ 2? or when ? 2 £2¡ p1¡ 2?? 2?+ 1¤. When
? ? 1
2
, 2+
p
1¡ 2? ? 2?+1 ? 4?. Because, by (A4), ? ? 0 only if ? ? 4?, the relevant
parameter range is ? 2 [2¡p1¡ 2?? 4?) which is a non-empty set only if ? ? b?. In sum,
the equilibrium where ?(?? ?) = [?? 1] exists for ? 2 (b?? ?] when ? 2 [2¡ p1¡ 2?? 4?).
(iii) Mediocre candidates. When citizens with an intermediate ability seek
candidacy, the solutions of (12) give the candidates with the highest and lowest ability.
From (13) and (14) we then get that ? = ?+?
2
is equivalent to ? = ?+?¡1
2
. As a result,
the average quality of potential candidates reads as
? = ? ¡ 1. (A9)
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Substituting (A9) for (13) and (14) gives the threshold levels for the candidates’
abilities
? = ? ¡ 1¡ p1¡ 2? (A10)
and
? = ? ¡ 1 +p1¡ 2?. (A11)
Note that the terms under square roots are always positive as ? ? 1
2
. Equation (A10)
shows that ? ? 0 only if ? ? 1 +
p
1¡ 2? and (A11) shows that ? ? 1 only if
? ? 2¡ p1¡ 2?. On the other hand, 2¡ p1¡ 2? ? 1 +p1¡ 2? only if ? ? b?. The
equilibrium where the citizens with an intermediate ability become candidates thus
exists only if ? 2 (1 +p1¡ 2?? 2¡ p1¡ 2?) and ? 2 (b?? ?].
(iv) Incompetent candidates. When citizens with the highest abilities choose
a career in private sector, the average quality of the potential candidates is ? = ?
2
?
Assuming that ? ? 1 and substituting ?
2
for ? in (14) gives
? =
1
2
·
? ¡ 2§
q
(? + 2)2 ¡ 16?
¸
. (A12)
Since the smaller root of (A12) is strictly less than (14), we observe that only the larger
root is relevant. The larger root of (A12),
? =
1
2
·
? ¡ 2 +
q
(? + 2)2 ¡ 16?
¸
? (A13)
satis…es our assumption that it is less than unity only if ? ? 1 + 4
3
?. We next con…rm
that the citizen with the lowest ability is also willing to be a candidate, i.e., that ? = 0.
From (13) we see that this holds if
0 ¸ ? +?¡ 1¡
q
(? + 1¡ ?)2 ¡ 8??
After some algebra, this can be expressed as
?(1¡?) ¸ 2?? (A14)
A necessary condition is thus that ? ¸ 2?. Substituting ? = ?
2
and (A13) into (A14),
and simplifying yields, after tedious algebra,
(? ¡ 2?)(?2 ¡ 2? + 2?) · 0? (A15)
Since ? ¸ 2?, (A15) holds when ? 2 £1¡ p1¡ 2?? 1 +p1¡ 2?¤, which is non-empty
with all ? ? 1
2
. Because 2? ¸ 1¡ p1¡ 2? and ? ¸ 2?, the relevant range of parameter
values is ? 2 £2?? 1 +p1¡ 2?¤. Because, by (A13), ? ? 1 only if ? ? 1 + 4
3
?, we need
to …nd when
p
1¡ 2? ? 4
3
?. This occurs when ? ? b?. Thus, the equilibrium where
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?(?? ?) = [0? ?] exists for ? 2 (b?? ?] when ? 2 £2?? 1 +p1¡ 2?¤, and for ? · b? when
? 2 [2?? 1 + 4
3
?).
(v) No democracy. We divide the analysis in two parts: ? ? ? and ? 2 [?? 2?).
If ? ? ?, no citizen is willing to campaign even if being assured of winning. Assume
next that ? 2 [?? 2?). Let us make the counter-assumption that both parties are able
to nominate a candidate in this region with probability one. Because ? ? 2?, the
expected payo¤ from candidacy cannot be positive, even without opportunity costs,
unless the expected probability of winning the general election is more than 1
2
. This
cannot hold for candidates of both parties.
(vi) Uniqueness. Follows directly from (i) to (iv).
Proof of Proposition 3. With incompetent candidates, average quality ? = ?
2
.
By (A13), ????? ? 0. With mediocre candidates, ????? ? 0 results from (A9). With
competent candidates, (A5) implies
??
??
=
1
4
"
1¡ ? + 1p
(? + 1)2 ¡ 16?
#
?
This is negative as ? ? 0 requires ? + 1 ?
p
(? + 1)2 ¡ 16? by (A5).
Proof of Proposition 4. a) The proof is immediate as ? ? 1
2
when candidates
are incompetent and ? = 1
2
in universal democracy. b) For ? ? b?, all four equilibria
with properly working democracy exist. The proof for (i) follows directly as ? = 1
2
with universal democracy, and ? ? 1
2
(? ? 1
2
) with competent (incompetent) candi-
dates. (ii) By Proposition 3, the average ability of mediocre candidates is increasing
in ?. By the proof of Proposition 2 (iii), the limit of the minimum value of ? is thenp
1¡ 2?. The maximum average ability of incompetent candidates can be obtained by
substituting ? = 1 +
p
1¡ 2? for (A13). This yields
? =
?
2
=
1
4
·p
1¡ 2?¡ 1 +
q
(3 +
p
1¡ 2?)2 ¡ 16?
¸
?
which simpli…es to
p
1¡ 2?, proving the claim.
(iii) By (A9) and Proposition 2, the average ability of mediocre candidates ranges fromp
1¡ 2? to 1¡ p1¡ 2? when ? ranges from 1 +p1¡ 2? to 2¡ p1¡ 2?. The claim
follows as
p
1¡ 2? ? 1
2
and 1¡ p1¡ 2? ? 1
2
8? 2 (b?? ?].
(iv) By (iii), the minimum value of ? with mediocre candidates is less than 1
2
, and thus
less than the value of ? with competent candidates. On the other hand, the limit of
the maximum value of ? with mediocre candidates is 1¡ p1¡ 2?, which exceeds the
limit of the minimum value of ? with competent candidates, which is 1
2
.
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Figure 1. Electoral game.
Figure 2. Political equilibria.
Figure 3. Good and bad candidates.
Figure 4. Set of candidates (e=4/9).
